This may seem evident to Thomasson, but why should anybody with an opposite feeling about the ordinary talk about numbers agree?

As mentioned in connection with several chapters of the book there is a large gap concerning the linguistic-philosophical foundations of both, the Easy Approach and some of the criticism towards other approaches. The application conditions represent just one (cluster of) concept(s) and compared to other concepts (!) it is rather clearly sketched. In contrast, the relation between reference and existence remains deeply enigmatic. Another example are the conditions for new concepts (and easy arguments) in chapter eight. – This deficit of the book could be compensated for by a global reference to a thorough introduction to these issues, though a couple of chapters devoted solely to the linguistic-philosophical infrastructure might have served that purpose as well. As it stands the book cannot be considered self-contained. This also goes to show that with all these fundamental but extra-ontological issues left open the Easy Approach might not be as easy as one expects – though still easier than the demanding approaches.

Despite the shortcomings and as pointed out above, the book is an achievement. The number of foes it legitimately criticizes is just too high to not deserve a benevolent reading that extends to the presentation of the Easy Approach, a discussion of its constructive and destructive merits with regard to all referred approaches to ontology, and ultimately recognition of some central aspects of the Easy Approach. Of course, this assessments makes it more of a work in progress than the author may have intended, but this is not bad at all because it may help the issue to be discussed longer into the future.

Study of the book is especially recommended for those who seek to reflect on their meta-ontological presumptions before, after, or while working in ontology. Not being opposed to all uses of ordinary language should be seen as a precondition if the reader wants to keep her temper. Awareness of philosophical methods and especially the knowledge of concepts from the philosophy of language should be regarded as obligatory so as to assess Thomasson’s arguments without solely relying on her convictions. If this condition is met, the book may even serve as an introductory text, albeit a biased one, which presents various contemporary approaches to ontology by reference to representative adherents to these approaches. In teaching, the book or its chapters may serve the purpose of a basis for discussion in advanced courses. A supplementation with other texts for parallel discussion is recommended.

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The publication under review is a festschrift honouring Peter Simons and his contributions to philosophy, on the occasion of his 65th birthday. Through his 40 years long career, Peter Simons has made considerable contributions to the field of philosophy. Through hundreds of papers, and a few books, he has enriched our understanding of a multitude

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8 Another issue with regard to which the ontologically interested reader will be at a loss are incomplete application conditions (204).
of subjects. His historical work on Austrian and Polish philosophers has provoked much deserved attention among philosophers upon two hitherto neglected traditions and their numerous philosophers. His historical work on the origins of analytic philosophy and of logic has integrated the Austrian and Polish traditions with work on canonical figures such as Frege and Wittgenstein. Simons’ systematic work, covering the fields of pure and applied ontology, philosophy of science, and philosophical logic, builds to a large degree upon this historical foundation, yet through his original insights he makes the resultant theories distinctively his own. Of the most well-known amongst these are his pioneering work on truth-makers (Mulligan, Simons & Smith 1984), his foundational work on mereology (Simons 1987), and his defence of an ontology of tropes (Simons 1994). An especially prominent feature of his work is his employment of logical resources (in many cases revived and developed by him) to issues in ontology.

The sixteen papers in the festschrift cover a good part of the subjects of which Simons has worked upon; the majority of which deal with pure and applied ontology while a minority deal with philosophy of mind and philosophical logic. A few of the papers also engage critically with Simons’ own work. Many of the contributors have previously worked directly with Simons, either as collaborators or students, while others have been strongly influenced by Simons’ work. Most of the papers, as well as the preface by the editor, contain an introductory remark (often in a footnote) with details on the authors’ relations to Simons and the occasional anecdote. For reasons of space, I regret that I am unable to discuss all papers in depth, although I at the very least give a brief summary of them. Note that numbers alone in round brackets refer to pages of the publication under review.

I Ontology

Kathrin Koslicki’s paper “In Defense of Substance” defends an Aristotelian concept of substance against Simons’ attack on this metaphysical concept (Simons 1998). Koslicki shows that on the whole Simons’ characterization of substances is similar to Aristotle’s in the Categories, and then she enumerates Simons’ main objections to substance. Rather than answering these objections, Koslicki instead argues that certain distinctions should be drawn, in fact the very distinctions that Aristotle himself draws in Metaphysics Z. Especially relevant is Aristotle’s introduction of hylomorphism, the theory that substances (e.g. Socrates) are further analyzable into form and matter, their more explanatory basic constituents. Koslicki herself argues elsewhere (Koslicki 2008) that form and matter are proper parts of the hylomorphic compound, but she emphasizes (rightly I think) that acceptance of this highly controversial view is unnecessary for the argument of this paper. Her point is that even if one accepts the characterization of substances in the Categories as that which is neither ‘said of’ (e.g. human is said of Socrates) nor ‘present in’ (e.g. a paleness is present in Socrates) something else9, viz. that substance is the ultimate subject

9 I must note that I find Koslicki’s presentation (68–69) of the ontological square (cf. Mulligan, Simons & Smith 1984 for a succinct account) somewhat peculiar, as she does not mention that which is both ‘said of’ and ‘present in’ a subject (i.e. the upper right corner of the square). As a result she, in my mind erroneously, equates ‘said of’ with essential predication and ‘present in’ with accidental predication. Admittedly, there is some controversy among Aristotle-scholars as to how to understand the category of what is only ‘present in’ a subject (especially
of predication, one can still accept that further explanatory analysis can be provided of substances. To illuminate this point, Koslicki distinguishes between two roles that the term ‘substance’ can play in metaphysics. (A) This is, first, a taxonomic role, in setting up a catalogue of existentially committing entities in the fashion of Quine. (B) Second, it plays a non-taxonomic role, attaching priority and importance to certain types of entities. I find this terminology quite confusing, since the non-taxonomic role seems to presuppose the taxonomic, and because a typical taxonomy is not a loose catalogue but rather an ordered structure. Substance in its taxonomic role is argued to be the same as Simons’ everyday substances, while in its non-taxonomic role it is argued to largely overlap with Simons’ metaphysical substances. Both of these roles, she argues, are found in Aristotle’s discussion in the *Categories*. In addition, through the distinction between absolute substancehood (substance *simpliciter*), relational substancehood (x substance of y), and comparative substancehood (x more substance than y), she constructs a plausible interpretation of the different ways a substance, its form, and its matter is said to be substance. In her paper Koslicki succeeds in highlighting the numerous different ways in which a concept of substance can be applied, and thus she shows that Simons’ objections only hold against one of these concepts of substance. She does not, however, prove that a concept of substance is indispensable for metaphysics, and there is no reason why Simons, or anyone else, might not find just as good objections against all of these other variants of substance. Koslicki has shown that debates about substance will persist, but in the end (to the chagrin of the present author and any other friend of substances) Simons might end up being right that substance belongs to a bygone age and is obsolete.

In his paper “On Basic Modes of Being: Metaphysical Reflections in Light of Whitehead, Husserl, Ingarden, Hintikka” David Woodruff Smith merges together different theories from these four philosophers. From Whitehead he takes the idea of a process as algorithmic, such that the process is ontologically dependent upon a concrescence structure. He then identifies this structure with Husserl’s ‘manifold’, such that a process’s concrescence structure defines its way of becoming, namely a formal process defining it in its ontological space. Returning to Whitehead, a process is defined both in terms of prehended processes and prehended forms or properties (‘prehended’ being a technical term Whitehead uses for the connection between an event and its antecedents). Smith thinks concrescence structures can be seen as patterns of dependence, and illuminated through Ingarden’s modes of being. However, whereas Ingarden has four (main) modes of being (cf. Thomasson 2012 and Johansson 2013), Smith has seven – and of these seven only two are among Ingarden’s modes (the real and the ideal), and two are among Ingarden’s existential moments which constitutes his modes (being actual, being necessary). Further, Smith has ontological dependence as a mode of being, while Ingarden defines his modes in terms of several existential moments where each pair (or quadruple) captures distinct types of dependence (and independence). I would prefer to keep these distinctions apart, especially as Smith’s argument centres around dependence, and later in the paper he indeed distinguishes some kinds of dependence (234–235) although they are not Ingarden’s distinctions (instead Smith builds on Husserl’s notion of founding viz. ontological grounding). It is also far whether this is to be understood as tropes). But I cannot see how simply fusing the category of ‘present in’ (e.g. this redness) with the category of both ‘present in’ and ‘said of’ (e.g. *Redness*), which as far as I can see is what Koslicki does, in any way can be an acceptable solution.
from clear to me how Smith arrives at his seven modes of being. It also seems problematic that each mode is connected to an existential moment which is the instantiation of that mode. For instance, the mode of being which he calls “being thus-and-so [. . .] the way universals are instantiated in particulars” would seem to give rise to something like Plato’s Third Man. Socrates instantiating *Human* would again be an existential moment, which in turn would instantiate the mode ‘being thus-and-so’. But then, wouldn’t the existential moment “Socrates instantiating *Human*” instantiating the mode ‘being thus-and-so’ be an existential moment, which also would instantiate the mode ‘being thus-and-so’; and from there one would have an infinite regress of instantiation-relations between ever more complex existential moments. But perhaps Smith has a ready answer to this objection. Smith’s paper contains many more interesting suggestions and discussions, and my brief presentation has only scratched the surface.

In her article “Computer-generated Music, Authorship, and Work Identity” Maria Elisabeth Reicher argues, *pace* Simons 1988, that the case of computer-generated music is not a good reason to abandon the concept of a musical work. Her argument relies upon a detailed ontology of art (defended in more detail in Reicher 1998a, 1998b, and 2003), where this ontology, like Simons’ own theory, is heavily influenced by Ingarden. Reicher follows Ingarden in defining art works as abstract objects that can be instantiated in many concrete particulars. This ontology is in and of itself highly interesting, although some figure or other pictorial representation would have been of much help to the reader. For her present argument, the concepts of authorship and concretisation are especially relevant. (A) Authors create at a particular time an art work (as an abstract type) through determining in an intentional act the internal properties (like its key and rhythm, not the name of its author and date of creation) of the work. (B) Authors leave certain internal properties of the art work indeterminate, and the determination of these properties (e. g. by a conductor and his orchestra) are the concretisations (again through an intentional act) of works in their own rights with the conductor etc. as co-authors together with the composer. Given this ontology, Reicher rules out the possibility that the computer or the computer program could author a musical work (*pace* e. g. Dennett 2013: 265–266) – because a computer or a computer program is not capable of intentional acts, viz. mental processes. Similarly, the possibility of a work without an author is ruled out. That leaves the possibility that the programmer is the sole author, or the possibility that the user is the sole author; or what Reicher takes to hold for the majority of cases, namely that the programmer and the user are co-authors. I find her conclusions plausible, and I am very much sympathetic to them, but I suppose her ontology of art to be quite controversial and her arguments here will derivatively be likewise.

II Ontology and Logic

Benjamin Schnieder defends the asymmetry of ‘because’, in a paper with that exact title, not only through responding to seven10 types of counterexamples, but also through sketching out an account of why ‘because’ is asymmetrical. Schnieder initially considers the possibility that an account can be given in terms of explanatory speech acts, or in terms

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10 Schnieder’s counterexamples are ordered from ‘a’ to ‘h’, however there is no counterexample named ‘e’.
of being irreflexive and transitive, but rejects both of these alternatives. Instead, he suggests that an Aristotelian semantics of ‘because’ can account for the asymmetry. The basic idea of this account is that ‘because’ “tracks relations of objective priority” (142), and “priority relations are asymmetrical by their nature” (ibid.). These priority relations differ in sort, and I understand Schnieder as mentioning efficient causes (“be causal”, ibid.), material causes (“concern what things consist of”, ibid.) and formal causes (“the essences of things”, ibid.), while the fourth kind of Aristotle’s αἰτία, the teleological, has been left out.\footnote{Schnieder also refers to Posterior Analytics I 3, where Aristotle discusses the demonstration of the posterior from the prior (and where the prior may be indemonstrable and sui generis). The relationship between Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and his αἰτία (especially the formal cause) are still in need of further research.} Aristotle’s αἰτία seems to combine causation (in a very broad sense encompassing all four αἰτία), explanation (as over-emphasized by Hocutt 1974), and objective (as contrasted with temporal) priority. Schnieders suggestion that objective priority is the basic sense of αἰτία is highly interesting. It might also be possible to give an analogous account of the relation between the broad Aristotelian sense of causation (or, for that matter, of metaphysical causation as used in the grounding-literature) and objective priority, even though Schnieder himself does not hint at the possibility. Schnieder also notes that metaphysical grounding can be “one of those priority relations supporting because-claims” (143). A small note of criticism to the paper is its overly modest conclusion – Schnieder does not give a mere “modest defence of the asymmetry thesis” (160), and his proposed account not just “seemed workable” (161). He gives a very solid defence, and his proposed account will, once it is worked out a bit more in detail, be a very promising account.

In his paper “Logical Grounding and First-Degree Entailments”, Fabrice Correia argues that Anderson and Belnap’s first-degree entailments are closely connected to weak grounding, and he presents the logical system FDE with its three variations corresponding to three types of logical grounding (weak, strict, and strict*).

“How to Speak of Existence: A Brentanian Approach to (Linguistic and Mental) Ontological Commitment” by Uriah Kriegel defends a Brentanian notion of existence. Under this notion, existence is no property of any sort belonging to the existing object, but rather an attitudinal property belonging to a mental state which is directed toward that object – namely the mental state of belief in the object, e. g. belief in cats and disbelief in ghosts (102).

Jan Woleński’s paper “An Analysis of Logical Determinism” argues against the view of Schlick and Waismann that logic (viz. the law of excluded middle and for Schlick also the law of contradiction) entail logical determinism. He does, however, accept Łukasiewicz’ assumption that bivalence and the principle of causality together are logically equivalent to radical determinism, yet he argues that the principle of causality is not a logical principle and therefore it can be logically proven that the views of Schlick and Waismann are wrong.

III Numbers as multitudes, and mereological issues

In his paper “Collections as One-and-Many – On the Nature of Numbers”, Ingvar Johanson critically discusses Simons’ view that the natural numbers are properties of multitudes. Simons takes multitudes to differ from both sets and mereological sums, in that a multitude
is nothing but its members. Further, Simons takes numbers to be non-distributive properties, such that the property is not possessed by the members of the multitude separately; and numbers are formal properties, in the sense that multitudes of e. g. concrete particulars, or abstract objects, or mental states, can have this property. Johansson accepts the basics of Simons’ view, with two minor exceptions; Johansson is a realist about properties and accepts fictional objects. However, Johansson wants to defend the view Husserl develops in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (dismissed by Simons) that multitudes are the result of cognitive combination and abstraction. Still, Johansson argues that both Husserl and Simons have overlooked two facts, and Johansson himself defends an in-between position combining aspects from both Husserl and Simons. The first of these is that a multitude functions both as many and as one (as one in the foreground and as many in the background, or *vice versa*), and is thus best apprehended as one-and-many. The second of these is that multitudes have virtual artificial boundaries, which have the status of social facts (and are thus real, following Searle’s analysis). Applying these two points, Johansson gives plausible accounts of single-member multitudes (where *pace* Simons such cases are not seen as degenerate), addition and multiplication (argued to be cases of boundary-reconstruction), and irrational numbers (argued to be proportion-relations between properties). In sum, this is a highly original paper on the nature of numbers, which gives deserved attention to both Husserl’s and Simons’ underappreciated theories.

“Non-Transitive Parthood, Leveled Mereology, and the Representation of Emergent Parts of Processes” by Johanna Seibt argues for a basic non-transitive relation of parthood, which she names ‘belonging with’. Classical mereology presupposes the ‘myth of the substance’ whereby (among others) a thing is equivocated with the spatial region it occupies, Seibt argues, and this myth hides the fact that spatial parthood is non-transitive. To illustrate the uses of the ‘belonging with’-relation Seibt sketches a Leveled Mereology (LEM), where LEM allows for feedback loops (viz. a whole can “be part of . . . part of itself”; p. 178) and entanglement of processes (e. g. the burning candle melts the wax and percolates it within the wick so that the candle burns and so on). Although Seibt herself defends a process ontology elsewhere, much of her argument in this paper seems to be compatible with an ontology containing both processes and substances (e. g. the Basic Formal Ontology, cf. Smith 2012), and her paper could thus have application beyond process ontologies.

Theodore Sider’s paper “Nothing Over and Above” discusses several views on the relationship between a whole and its parts. First, he rejects Kit Fine’s theory of summative identity (Fine 2010), both because it does not imply weak supplementation and because it, *prima facie*, is unable to deal with a counterexample presented by Sider (202–3). Second, he rejects the ‘composition-as-identity’ view, because it does not imply any principles of classical mereology. Third, he rejects the number-indifference view, in which the distinction between singulars and plurals is abandoned, because of an objection involving an *x* with no proper parts whereby this *x* seems to be objectively one. Fourthly, he discusses the view that it is not the parts and the whole that is identical, but rather the fact that the parts exist is identical with the fact that the whole exist. Sider says that this view captures much of the rhetorical force behind the slogan that the whole is nothing over and above the parts, yet it misses the target of explaining the relationship between a whole and its parts (at most one can deny that there is such a relationship, e. g. because there is no whole). Lastly, Sider suggests that classical mereology might be able to explain the relationship, because unrestricted composition is an axiom of classical mereology, although this *sui generis*
explanation might be found wanting for some. All in all, the results of this paper are mostly negative, and it could perhaps have benefited from discussing some of Simons’ own views on the question.

IV Truth; Twardowski, Bolzano, and von Wright

In her paper “The Things We Call True”, Maria van der Schaar argues that there are two problems with Simons’ account of truth-bearers (in Simons 2003 and 2008): (A) the truth-bearers are too diverse (viz. judgement, understanding, assumption, assertions), and cannot, as Simons argues, be grouped together as propositions. (B) It is unclear what a true act of understanding means. Van der Schaar thinks this calls for a different account, specifically an account closer to Twardowski’s. However, while Twardowski distinguished between the act of judgement and the judgement made, van der Schaar adds a third notion, which she calls the judgement candidate. She gives the example of a person dancing (analogous to the act of judgement), the danced dance (analogous to the judgement made), and a choreography (analogous to the judgement candidate). In her discussion of choreography, there are some overlaps with Reicher’s paper (a choreography and a musical score are both art works). Further, van der Schaar applies Aristotle’s threefold distinction between the potential to attain a potential, having a potential, and actualizing that potential (cf. De Anima 417a21-b1), and thus she arrives at a fivefold distinction of judgement (316). I am uncertain to what extent Simons himself would find the criticism of his position compelling, and I am even more uncertain if he would find van der Schaar’s alternative to be acceptable (although her rejection of the Platonism inherent in Frege’s Gedanke would, I think, find a sympathetic ear in Simons).

The paper by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, “Bolzano’s Definition of Analytic Propositions”, argues that Bolzano’s definition of analyticity has definite advantages over the Frege-Quine definition. For Bolzano, propositions-in-themselves have the property of analyticity if they contain at least one idea inessentially (i.e. an idea which can be interchanged with another idea without changing the proposition’s truth-value). The main advantage of Bolzano’s definition is that it is free of epistemological notions. The authors gradually, in the face of several prima facie problems, expand upon Bolzano’s basic definition, and in the end with the fourth modification they settle on a definition involving Bolzano’s definition together with two additions: (A) it is always true (or always false), and (B) through understanding the open sentence (this is the authors modification of Bolzano’s propositions-in-themselves) it is recognizable by anyone that the open sentence is analytic. This last addition brings into the definition an epistemological notion, whereas the main advantage of Bolzano’s definition was that it was free of epistemological notions. To improve on this situation the authors tentatively suggest that “a properly non-epistemic notion of analyticity must […] find use for the notion of grounding […]” (352).

“On Having a Property. Corrigenda in Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre” by Wolfgang Künne discusses Bolzano’s preference for the schema ‘Socrates has courage’ in favour of the schema ‘Socrates is courageous’. Künne takes Bolzano’s reasons for this preference to be inconclusive, and aims to settle this problem conclusively. On Bolzano’s preferred schema, ‘has’ functions as a connector between an object (Socrates) and a property (courage). Künne notes that Bolzano is here ambiguous, in that the property can either
be an adherence\(^{12}\) (e. g. Socrates’ courage) or an ascribable attribute (e. g. Courage), which can be predicated of several objects. \(^{13}\) As a result, the connector ‘has’ is also ambiguous: if it relates an adherence, then the relation is irreflexive, asymmetrical, and intransitive; whereas if it relates an attribute, it is partim-reflexive (i. e. neither reflexive nor irreflexive), partim-symmetrical, and partim-transitive (390). Künne suggests that the decisive factor in deciding between an adherence reading and an attribute reading is compatibility with Bolzano’s definition of truth, and he argues that only an attribute reading is thus compatible.

Edgar Morscher’s paper “The Logic of Truth” presents von Wright’s Quantificational Truth-Logic, argues that it has severe shortcomings (and even that von Wright “corrupted his own intuitions” (420)), yet that these shortcomings can be corrected through the exemption of sentences which are insensitive to truth-values.

V Meinong, Husserl, and Entertaining

Both the paper by Kevin Mulligan, “Annehmen, Phantasieren und Entertaining. Husserl und Meinong”, and by Mark Textor, “Meaning, Entertaining, and Phantasy Judgement”, discuss Meinong’s (and Mulligan also discusses Husserl’s) theory of assumption, imagination, phantasy judgement, and entertaining. The two papers nicely complement each other. Mulligan’s paper is primarily historical (although some comparisons to competing views are made in the conclusion), and the theories of Meinong and Husserl are explicated through extensive quotes and discussion. Whereas Textor argues that the application of Meinong’s theory can solve a basic problem of the intensional semantics of Marty and Grice, namely the problem that it fails in those cases where the audience judges the speaker to be untruthful – which was not the judgement that the speaker intended the audience to make. Textor argues that the speaker’s intended effect is a phantasy judgement, and that this phantasy judgement is under the control of the speaker.

VI Concluding Remarks

A minor deficiency of the volume is that there are quite a few typographical errors, especially concerning references, although no single author is particularly to blame for this. Its high-quality papers will be of interest to researchers across many fields of philosophy, and many of the papers do not presuppose too much from the reader and are thus accessible to non-experts, although I would not recommend the volume to undergraduate students. The festschrift is a fitting tribute to Peter Simons’ many invaluable contributions to philosophy of which, I hope, there are still many more to come.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{12}\) Adherences, Künne argues with conviction, ”suffer from being called ‘tropes’ by Anglophone ontologists […]” (375 n. 25; cf. also Strawson 2011: 200–201).

\(^{13}\) Cf. Mulligan et al. 1984 for a succinct presentation of this distinction.

\(^{14}\) I would like to thank Ludger Jansen and Markus Schrenk for very helpful comments.
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