Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy

Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse

History of Ontology and a focus on Plato

Geschichte der Ontologie und ein Schwerpunkt zu Platon

mentis
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account empirical data. After briefly explicating the legal notion of a corporation as a fictional person, the authors consider in what respects corporations, like individuals, have moral responsibility. Werhane and Freeman argue that corporations are moral agents, but not moral persons. Although corporations, like individuals, can be held morally responsible for their actions, corporations are not intentional agents: ‘… corporations exhibit intentional behaviour, engage in reciprocal accountability relationships, are subject to rights, and are said to act. But their so-called intentions, their accountability relationships, and their ‘actions’ are the collective result of decisions made by individual persons.’ (522) The notion of collective action is useful, say Werhane and Freeman, in understanding why one typically holds a corporation and not merely its managers and agents responsible for its ‘actions’. Each individual input becomes transformed both as it mixes with other inputs and as managerial directives are interpreted. The result often is a collective action that differs from the actions of its constituents. Thus, in principle, there could be a questionable outcome of corporate decision-making that results from blameless individual actions. This can result in moral blindness on the part of the individual members of the corporation, who do not feel responsible for the questionable practices of their corporation. Nevertheless, corporations as collectives are made up of persons who are morally responsible. Moral blindness, say Werhane and Freeman, ‘does not excuse a corporation from moral responsibility, just as it does not excuse rational free individual moral agents.’ (525). Werhane and Freeman conclude their discussion by showing the extent to which corporations can do good works.

The articles I have highlighted here are a representative sample of the collection. Each offers detailed treatment of central concerns in practical ethics; and in most cases this analysis is combined with thoughtful and original contributions to ongoing debates. Although not written for a general audience, the collection is sufficiently accessible to be of interest to non-specialists concerned with practical ethical issues. With its mix of theoretical discussion and empirical study, this Handbook, like others in the Oxford series, is a valuable resource for professional philosophers, lawyers, and policymakers.

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‘To what extent was Nietzsche influenced by the overwhelmingly scientistic culture of his day? What is its significance for his philosophy?’ Posed by Gregory Moore on p. 9 of his excellent introductory survey, these questions set the tone for the latest and in many respects groundbreaking essay collection on Nietzsche and science. The book’s overall orientation is thus predominantly historical, which is also reflected in the editors’ affiliation to departments of German studies and the history of ideas. Occasioned by the 2001 conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society, the ten papers collected here are announced as focussing less on ‘Nietzsche’s critique of modern science in general’ than ‘the issue of his familiarity with, and relationship to, particular scientific disciplines’ (12). By doing so, as Moore explains in laudable detail, they help to fill a disturbing ‘vacuum’ in the scholarship on Nietzsche and science. The book’s overall orientation is thus predominantly historical, which is also reflected in the editors’ affiliation to departments of German studies and the history of ideas. Occasioned by the 2001 conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society, the ten papers collected here are announced as focussing less on ‘Nietzsche’s critique of modern science in general’ than ‘the issue of his familiarity with, and relationship to, particular scientific disciplines’ (12). By doing so, as Moore explains in laudable detail, they help to fill a disturbing ‘vacuum’ in the scholarship on the subject, which so far could merely boast sophisticated commentaries on Nietzsche’s relation to Darwinism, scientific concepts of time, and Freudian psychoanalysis (9–12). However, despite the declared emphasis of the book, and although Nietzsche’s ‘critique of modern science in general’ has indeed already been the subject of several recent studies (by, as Moore notes himself, George J. Stack, Christoph Cox, and Babette E. Babich), the latter, too, is repeatedly thematised in *Nietzsche and Science*. As a consequence – in what looks like a strenuous effort to accommodate the papers of three unruly contributors (Babich, Acam-
A near-perfect example of these strengths is already provided by the first essay, Thomas H. Brobjer’s ‘Nietzsche’s Reading and Knowledge of Natural Science: An Overview’. Comprehensive, well-written, accessibly structured, and painstakingly conscientious, this is a masterpiece of philological contextualisation and bound to become a standard reference work on the subject. The essay traces Nietzsche’s engagement with the natural sciences through the four conventionally distinguished phases of his intellectual development while devoting brief extra sections to discussions of the exceptional years 1881–83 and the special topic of Darwinism. To substantiate his claims, Brobjer regularly draws on the evidence of the philosopher’s notes, letters, book purchases and borrowings. He even considers Nietzsche’s margin jottings and underlined passages. Among the numerous under-researched links Brobjer uncovers, analytical philosophers might regard as most interesting Nietzsche’s reception of Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach, the founders of critical positivism and philosophical precursors of the Vienna Circle (41–44).

Compared to Brobjer’s piece, Richard S. G. Brown’s ‘Nietzsche: “That Profound Physiologist”’ disappoints in both presentation and content. Brown’s dismissal, for instance, of what he calls ‘the Unmentionables’, i.e. authors who ignore Nietzsche’s physiological claims and metaphors, is confusingly overturned by his subsequent discussion of Thomas Nagel and Ludwig Feuerbach. These two, he seems to forget, do not comment on Nietzsche’s physiological claims either and thus hardly belong into a section titled Who thought What about Nietzsche and Physiology? (53). Overall, Brown’s seems a rather disjointed account of the role of physiology in Nietzsche’s work. After highlighting its association with the morality of Buddhism in Ecce Homo and The Antichrist, he offers some useful but barely connected discussions of relevant secondary texts. These are in turn followed by an enumeration of Nietzsche’s direct references to physiology, and finally a series of arguments for deeming the latter Nietzsche’s ‘key to solving the most fundamental problems and questions posed by philosophy’ (65). Thanks to the different uses and unstable epistemological status of physiology in Nietzsche’s writings, Brown can adduce several passages in support of his claim, but at the same time tacitly omits relevant counter-examples. These can be found not only in Nietzsche’s early notes (in 1866, for instance, he wrote that ‘our visible (physical) organs are, like all other parts of the world of phenomena, only images of an unknown object’), but also in later publications such as Beyond Good and Evil (cf. Nadeem J. Z. Hussein’s contribution to the essay collection, esp. 121ff). Add to this Brown’s sloppy close reading – the passage he quotes on p. 64, for instance, clearly deplores humanity’s ignorance of physiology rather than Nietzsche’s own – and the reader has little reason to linger.

The next chapter, ‘Nietzsche, Medicine and Meteorology’, constitutes once again a masterly exercise in historical contextualisation. Here, Gregory Moore addresses the questions of how the health-obsessed philosopher perceived his own illnesses, their meaning in terms of nineteenth-century discourses on health and sickness (in which climate played a considerable role), and the impact of these discourses on Nietzsche’s writings. Although Moore slightly overstates his case when he describes Nietzsche’s interest in medicine as having ‘little to do with the acquisition of abstract knowledge or extending the metaphorical resources of his writing’ (72), its often very practical origins in the philosopher’s autobiography are well worth spelling out. Moore does so lucidly, systematically, and in unprecedented detail. The one point of criticism readers might raise with regard to his account concerns Nietzsche’s
philosophical uses of his ‘conventional medical wisdom’ (88). Commenting rather briefly on the subject, Moore tends to give the impression of a simple spill-over from life to work. According to him, Nietzsche’s entire critique of Judaeo-Christian values must actually be seen as a reaction to the ‘systematic conflation of morality and health’ at the time (86) – a claim that, while certainly arguable, is not argued in the essay. Moore does, however, refer to his recent study *Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor* (2002) for a full discussion of the question, and although a brief summary of his main arguments might have aided the sceptical reader, its absence is amply made up for by his use of the saved space.

Moore’s is followed by yet another solid piece in the collection: Christian J. Emden’s ‘Metaphor, Perception and Consciousness: Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Neurophysiology’. Appealing to the early writings and scientific background reading of the philosopher, it aims to show that Nietzsche’s descriptions of mental processes in terms of metaphor are ‘based on the idea that the relationship between nerve stimuli and mental activity can be explained according to the relatively new assumption that nerve fibres serve as conductors for electric flows’ (99). Emden accumulates much interesting evidence for this connection. And while perhaps not the first to note the presence of the nerve stimulus in Nietzsche’s language model, he certainly breaks new ground by recognising its importance. His overall claim, however, fails to convince at least the present reviewer. For no matter how many books on electrophysiology the young Nietzsche might have read by the time he wrote about rhetorics – and Emden shows they were quite a few – not once can he be found to ascribe any importance to the electrical nature of intra-nervous transmissions. *Pace* Emden, it appears that what interested Nietzsche and galvanised his talk of metaphor were rather the unexplained ‘translations’ from one medium (e.g. the nerve stimulus) into a starkly different one (e.g. the perceived image) than the particular internal functionings of each medium in itself (cf. Nietzsche’s example of Chladni visualisations in *On Truth and Lying*).

Another and overall more convincing interpretation of Nietzsche’s views on physiology and science in general is offered by Nadeem J. Z. Hussein’s ‘Reading Nietzsche Through Ernst Mach’, an essay decidedly among the strongest in *Nietzsche and Science*. Hussein’s sustained and attentive close reading of certain influential passages is a practice still too rare among Nietzsche scholars, many of whom tend to range over the whole of their subject’s fragmented writings, picking out brief quotations here and there. Building on a topic raised in Brobjør’s survey, namely Nietzsche’s relation to critical positivism, Hussein aims to demonstrate that the ideas of the philosopher and physicist Ernst Mach (1938–1916) provide a plausible interpretation of Nietzsche’s central epistemological statements. First concentrating on the relevant sections in *Twilight of the Idols* (1889), Hussein brings out the indeed striking parallels between Nietzsche’s and Mach’s understanding of ‘the true world’ (113ff). His subsequent speculations, though, about a direct textual influence, are somewhat less conclusive than he makes out. For as has been illustrated not least by Emden’s essay, Nietzsche’s epistemological position already began to take shape in his rhetorical writings of the early seventies, and although Mach’s earliest papers did come out in that year, it is nowhere recorded, and in fact extremely unlikely, that the young Nietzsche was aware of them. Yet, as Hussein puts it, ‘the crucial issue is still, of course, whether reading Nietzsche through Mach allows us to make sense of his views’ (121), and that it does is again clear from the next section of his essay, which takes on the paradoxical critique of sensualism in *Beyond Good and Evil* (§ 15). To do justice to the increasingly unfashionable Mach, Hussein might perhaps have drawn more attention to the fact that he proposes some well worked-out answers where Nietzsche merely raises questions, but all in all the essay succeeds admirably in showing Nietzsche’s kindred spirit with someone ‘whose pro-science credentials are hard to criticize’ (126), yet who is still profoundly sceptical of contemporary scientific realism.
The second, less historically oriented part of *Nietzsche and Science* begins with Babette E. Babich’s ‘Nietzsche’s Critique of Scientific Reason and Scientific Culture: On “Science as a Problem” and Nature as Chaos’. By ‘science as a problem’, the subject of her first two sections, Babich refers to the problem of the self-grounding of science – or rather the scientific method (141) – a problem which she describes as ‘a task to be accomplished over time, not merely as a point to be made or a problem to be remedied’ (140). How exactly this task might be accomplished remains open, unless it is by her own practice of spelling out some ramifications of the problem (e.g. its consequences for subjectivity; 145), politicising the concepts involved (141), or simply by art (151). In the following sections, Babich adds to her discussion Nietzsche’s understanding of nature as fertile chaos (which she assumes he uses in Hesiod’s sense to mean ‘a yawn, a gap’; 143) and interprets him as something of a scientific ‘pragmatist’ (148) before, towards the end, commenting on the ‘genealogy of logic and even reason itself’ that can be found in his early writings (149f). The problem with assessing Babich’s many arguments is the fact that it is often unclear what exactly they are arguments for, that for much of her essay she seems to deal in impressions, learned associations, and critical innuendos against ‘traditional philosophers of science’ (142). Her writing style poses another difficulty and is perhaps best illustrated by the following example sentence (with which she starts a new paragraph): ‘Nietzsche’s critical undertaking challenges the possibility of any knowledge of the philosophic (epistemic) foundations of science (as art) conceived in the light of what he speaks of as art’ (141). Moreover, Babich’s sweeping statements about Nietzsche are often inadequately supported by the brief, parenthetic references she makes to his work. Some of them are quite daring interpretations, after all, and as such might deserve being weighed against possible alternatives by means of close readings à la Hussein. A statement for which she fails even to give a reference is her claim that ‘Nietzsche would challenge the idea that anything be thought to be self-grounded or, indeed, self-caused’ (136), which seems difficult to reconcile with her later account of Nietzsche’s understanding of chaotic nature as ‘creative self-genesis’ (144). With similar inconsistency, she spends several paragraphs calling for ‘historical sensitivity’ (138f) before recklessly declaring that ‘a relatively uncritical or trusting adulation of science has characterized intellectual culture since the days not only of Newton but also of Lucretius’ (141). Her unreferenced allusions to thinkers such as Heidegger, Emerson, or Davidson might suggest that condensation is the problem, and that Babich’s essay should perhaps be read as a short-hand survey of her previous work rather than a step-by-step contribution to scholarship. Yet why then waste pages of valuable space discussing the difference between ‘science’ and ‘Wissenschaft’ (136ff)? Or the barely relevant details of Greek chaos mythology (143f)?

With Robin Small’s ‘What Nietzsche Did During the Science Wars’, the reader returns once again to the safe ground of competent historical contextualisation. This essay investigates Nietzsche’s engagement with nineteenth-century conflicts in the natural sciences, whose public expressions tended to be politicised along the lines of nationality – e.g., most notably, English empiricism versus German theory-drivenness. Small differentiates further, of course, and carefully traces Nietzsche’s wavering relations to the various camps of opinion. Much of his research in this area is likely to provide useful background information for future interpretations of Nietzsche’s work. Of most direct philosophical interest, perhaps, is Nietzsche’s hostile response to the Leibnizian teleology of a popular scientific text by Otto Caspari, who invokes a form of ‘macrocyclic organicism’ to answer Thomson’s theory of ‘final thermal equilibrium’ (161f). Highlighting the relevance of this debate, Small positions Nietzsche’s theory of eternal recurrence within the (popular) scientific culture of his time. The second part of his essay offers further illuminating comments on Nietzsche’s relation to Darwinism – established partly through works by Paul Réé and Herbert Spencer (both of whom Small discusses at appropriate length) and usually in connection with morality.
Insufficiently informed about the theory of evolution, Nietzsche was evidently in closer agreement with the English biologist than is suggested by some of his ill-tempered polemics (cf. 167).

Darwinism also makes an appearance in Christa Davis Acampora’s ‘Between Mechanism and Teleology: Will to Power and Nietzsche’s Gay Science’. Here, however, it is dismissed along with ‘the mechanistic world-view’ as a theory of development still implicitly teleological and thus not ‘naturalistic’ enough for Nietzsche (173). His attempts to find an alternative to ‘existing accounts of organic development’ (171), which are already manifest in his aborted doctoral project about Kant and teleology, form the guiding theme of Acampora’s essay. Although initially very promising and engaging, from her discussion of Heraclit’s influence onwards, Acampora’s account becomes increasingly less lucid. Nietzsche’s Heraclitian vision of childplay as a metaphor for ‘the becoming of physis’ might be suggestive to a certain extent, but is still far from clear enough to form the basis of an argument (cf. 177f.). His remarks about ‘centres of force’, ‘human and non-human alike’, each constructing the world from ‘its own viewpoint’ also raise far too many questions to serve as explanations (179). Like so many, Acampora’s text might have profited from more sustained close readings of entire passages from Nietzsche’s work – even at the cost of covering less ground. As it is, the most accessible parts of her central discussions are those in which she presents critical secondary literature such as Keith Ansell Pearson’s, to whom – reassuringly for the present reviewer – Nietzsche’s theory of will to power ‘looks decidedly awkward and hugely problematic’ (181). With her particularly opaque combination of themes, Acampora seems to have bitten off more than she, most of her readers, and perhaps anybody including Nietzsche, can chew.

A more bite-sized morsel of interpretation is offered by Duncan Large. His ‘Nietzsche’s Conceptual Chemistry’ is exceptionally brief – the introduction alone takes up almost a third of the essay (189–191). Yet it makes an interesting and thoroughly researched point about Nietzsche’s occasional allusions to chemistry. Repeatedly invoking it as a metaphor for his own genealogical analyses and even toying with the idea of studying it at university, Nietzsche habitually contrasts chemistry with the scientific disciplines which, on some occasions, he accuses of nihilistic reductionism, i.e. of the repression of differences for the sake of ultimately fictional universality. This opposition of his is of course open to challenge, but its validity not the subject of Large’s essay.

In the last chapter of the book, Tracy B. Strong investigates three early texts of Nietzsche’s: On the Future of Our Educational Institutions, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, and The Birth of Tragedy. In these, his excellently written ‘Wonder, Science and the Voice of Philosophy’ identifies the young professor’s project of establishing a new, Pre-Socratically inspired kind of popular philosophy as ‘aesthetic understanding’ (211), a philosophy, that is to say, which encompasses in complex conjunction morality, myth and science in the broad sense of Wissenschaft (207 and 202). While on the whole very persuasive, Strong’s reading is too often a reading between Nietzsche’s lines (rather than of them) not to leave any room for doubt. Nietzsche’s once declared goal, for example, of wanting ‘to take away from human existence some of its heartbreaking and awful quality’ is not necessarily the same as wanting to turn ‘all humans’ into artist-scientist-philosophers (209). And sceptics might object that for giving rise to a life-long ‘mission’ (212), the project in question has resulted in suspiciously few mission statements – even if one counts all the possible candidates adduced by Strong and takes into account the discouraging first reception of The Birth of Tragedy. Yet whether or not the project of Nietzsche’s new philosophy forms indeed the governing theme of the three early texts, and, more controversially, also lies behind all of his subsequent writings, Strong’s is certainly an interpretation worth considering in future readings of Nietzsche’s work, connecting, as it does, all traditionally distinguished phases of the latter.
To sum up, *Nietzsche and Science* includes enough substantial scholarship and fresh approaches to deserve recommendation. Most of the work included is both accessible and of interest even to non-specialist students of the brush-bearded philosopher. Those with a strictly analytical background should be prepared, however. Especially the pieces by Babich and Acampora are likely to test their patience. Hussein’s, Brobjer’s and most other essays, by contrast, would make for a reasonably smooth transition into the field of historical Nietzsche exegesis. Those interested in nineteenth-century science *per se* will be additionally pleased by the descriptive and anecdotal detail that saturates the book nearly throughout. It should be added that despite the stated overall goal of the collection – namely of highlighting both breadth and depth of Nietzsche’s scientific preoccupations – one can hardly help noticing in many of the essays a thematic preponderance of the discipline of physiology. This leaves one with the impression that, while a constant source of his imagery and in some respects integral to his work, Nietzsche’s active philosophical engagement with the natural sciences was somewhat limited in scope after all.

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The theory that there are real laws of nature is the view that there are certain fundamental truths about the world that explain the world’s regularities. In his recent book, Mumford asks the metaphysical question whether there are laws *in* nature, whether laws describe something real in the natural world. His reply is a resounding no. He outlines and motivates an alternative, according to which all the world’s necessity can be found in powerful modal properties and their relations, a view he calls *realist lawlessness*. It is *realist* in so far as it agrees with the nomological realist view that there is natural necessity in nature; it is *lawless* in so far as it disagrees that laws are responsible for this nomic role. Mumford argues that talk of a metaphysics of laws is a harmful metaphor, which results in a misleading view of the universe as consisting of discrete and inert categorical properties which depend upon the laws of nature for animation. Mumford attacks this view by arguing for two central claims: that there is no existing credible account of the role of laws and that once realist lawlessness is accepted there is no vacant role that laws would be needed to fill anyway.

This book is a refreshing and stimulating discussion of laws aimed at both the scientist and the metaphysician. It not only presents an interesting alternative view to nomological realism, but also a dilemma argument against the claim that real laws play a governing role in nature. The book is suitable reading for advanced undergraduates, postgraduates and academics in both the sciences and philosophy.

In Chapter 1, Mumford presents three competing metaphysical pictures of reality, *Humean Lawlessness*, *Nomological Realism* and his own *Realist Lawlessness*. The rest of the book is divided into three sections, one for each of these pictures. The first two of these provide a comprehensive and detailed discussion of a central debate in metaphysics and the philosophy of science regarding Humean and realist views of laws of nature. Contrary to the usual portrayal of the regularity view of laws, Mumford claims that the Humean metaphysic is in fact lawless. He characterises the central dispute between Humeans and Realists as directly related to the inferences that they make from the denial or acceptance of necessary connections in nature. The Humean denies that there is natural necessity in nature, which according to Mumford, entails that there are no laws in nature. In contrast, the realists affirm that there is natural necessity in nature, which they take to entail that there are laws in nature. In Section III, Mumford advances his own theory of Realist Lawlessness, which